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Non technical summary 
In March 2007, the European Council has agreed upon ambitious climate and energy policy 
targets for the period after the expiry of the Kyoto Protocol in the year 2012. It envisages 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the EU by 2020 by at least 20% compared to 1990 
levels – and by 30% if other industrialized countries undertake similar efforts. Given large 
divergences among industrialized and developing countries on a potential post-Kyoto 
architecture, an international agreement on ambitious future abatement targets remains 
uncertain for the time being. Against this background, unilateral EU environmental policy has 
caused concerns about adverse competitiveness implications for European energy-intensive 
and export-oriented sectors. Employing a multi-sector, multi-region computable general 
equilibrium model of international energy use and global trade, we analyze the 
competitiveness implications of introducing border tax adjustments (BTA) and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) within the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Our 
quantitative simulation results demonstrate that alternative BTA regimes are suitable to 
alleviate adverse competiveness implications of unilateral European climate policy on energy-
intensive and export-oriented industries. However, the regulatory protection of these 
industries via subsidies for EU exporters and tariffs for non-EU importers goes at the expense 
of sectors which are excluded from the EU ETS. Our simulations further indicate that even 
restricted CDM access for EU ETS participants induces comparable output effects for EU 
energy-intensive and export-oriented sectors as the most ambitious BTA regime. Increasing 
“where-flexibility” of emission abatement for EU ETS participants via limited access to the 
CDM can thus be an attractive market-based alternative to the application of border tax 
adjustments for alleviating adverse competitiveness impacts of unilateral climate policy. 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Der Ministerrat der Europäischen Union hat sich im März 2007 zu einer ambitionierten 
Klimapolitik verpflichtet: Falls kein internationales Klimaschutzabkommen für die Zeit nach 
dem Kyoto-Protokoll zustande kommt, sollen die Treibhausgas-Emissionen der EU bis zum 
Jahr 2020 um 20% gegenüber 1990 reduziert werden. Eine solche unilaterale EU-
Klimapolitik könnte jedoch die europäische Wettbewerbsfähigkeit beeinträchtigen und ihre 
Umweltwirksamkeit durch die Verlagerung energieintensiver Industrien ins nichteuropäische 
Ausland unterlaufen. Zur Abfederung dieser Effekte können Politikmaßnahmen wie 
Umweltzölle („Border Tax Adjustments”) oder projektbasierte Emissionsreduktionen in 
Entwicklungsländern („Clean Development Mechanism”) im EU-Emissionshandelssystem 
(EU ETS) eingesetzt werden. Mit Hilfe eines multiregionalen und multisektoralen 
berechenbaren allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodells der Weltwirtschaft untersucht dieses 
Papier die makroökonomischen Implikationen beider Politikmaßnahmen. Die quantitativen 
Simulationsergebnisse zeigen, dass Umweltzölle ein geeignetes Instrument zur Abfederung 
der negativen Effekte auf die europäische Wettbewerbsfähigkeit darstellen. Allerdings geht 
eine solche Kompensation durch Umweltzölle zu Lasten der Sektoren, die vom EU-
Emissionshandel ausgenommen sind. Die Simulationen zeigen zudem, dass ein beschränkter 
Zugang zu projektbasierten Emissionsreduktionen in Entwicklungsländern vergleichbare 
Produktionseffekte für energie- und exportintensive Industrien der EU impliziert wie das 
anspruchsvollste Umweltzoll-Regime. Die Ermöglichung regionaler Flexibilität der 
Emissionsvermeidung mit Hilfe des „Clean Development Mechanism” kann somit eine 
attraktive marktbasierte Alternative zur Erhebung von Umweltzöllen darstellen, um die 
nachteiligen ökonomischen Auswirkungen unilateraler Klimapolitik abzufedern. 
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Abstract. Ambitious unilateral EU environmental policy has raised concerns about adverse 
competitiveness implications for European energy-intensive and export-oriented sectors. We 
analyze the economic and environmental implications of two different measures to address 
these concerns in the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS): border tax adjustments (BTA) 
and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Numerical simulations with a computable 
general equilibrium model of the global economy demonstrate that alternative BTA regimes 
are suitable to alleviate adverse competiveness implications of unilateral European climate 
policy on energy-intensive and export-oriented industries. The regulatory protection of these 
industries via subsidies for EU exporters and tariffs for non-EU importers goes, however, at 
the expense of sectors which are excluded from the EU ETS. We show that the choice of 
alternative benchmarks (i.e. carbon intensities) for the level of BTA substantially affects these 
competitiveness implications. The simulations further indicate that limited access to low-cost 
emission abatement via the CDM in the EU ETS alleviates adverse competitiveness impacts 
to a comparable extent as the most ambitious BTA scheme. Increasing “where-flexibility” of 
emission abatement thus represents an attractive market-based alternative to the application of 
border tax adjustments in unilateral climate policy. 
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1 Introduction 
The European Union has recently started reforming regulations related to its future energy and 
climate policy in general and to the European Emission Trading System (EU ETS) in 
particular. In March 2007, the European Council has agreed upon ambitious climate and 
energy policy targets for the period after the expiry of the Kyoto Protocol in the year 2012. It 
envisages reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the EU by 2020 by at least 20% compared to 
1990 levels, and by 30% if other industrialized countries undertake similar efforts. In January 
2008, the European Commission presented a comprehensive legislative package intended to 
implement the ambitious goals formulated by the European Council for the year 2020 (EU, 
2008, 2008a). The package consists of new regulations for the third trading period within the 
European Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), a decision defining national emission targets for 
the sectors excluded from the Emission Trading Scheme (NETS sectors) and finally new 
regulations to promote the use of energy from renewable sources and to support the 
development of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS). 
Given large divergences among industrialized and developing countries on the Post-Kyoto 
architecture, an international agreement on ambitious future abatement targets remains rather 
uncertain for the time being. Ambitious unilateral EU environmental policy causes concerns 
about adverse competitiveness implications for European energy-intensive and export-
oriented sectors. As a remedy, the European Parliament has recently proposed to consider 
border tax adjustments (BTA) for third countries which are not foreseen by the Kyoto 
Protocol (European Parliament, 2007). Border measures are also mentioned in the proposal by 
the European Commission. The European legislation linking the EU ETS with the Kyoto 
Protocol’s project-based mechanisms allows European companies to generate potentially low-
cost emission reductions by means of the CDM (EU, 2004). Thus, the access to the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) is in principle suitable to alleviate competitive 
disadvantages of European producers. However, some limits may apply to the use of CDM 
credits in order to assure that emission abatement in third countries remains supplemental to 
domestic action (see Anger, 2008, for the case of linking the EU ETS internationally). 
The most recent CGE-related literature has mainly focused on assessing competitiveness 
effects associated with the implementation of the EU ETS (Bollen et al., 2003; Klepper and 
Peterson, 2004; COWI, 2004; Reinaud, 2005; Peterson, 2006; Alexeeva-Talebi and Anger, 
2007). Contributions in the field of environmental economics discuss border tax adjustments 
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(BTA) in the context of climate policy under the Kyoto Protocol and as a complementary 
policy measure of the EU ETS (Mathiesen and Maestad; 2004, Babiker and Rutherford, 2005; 
Demailly and Quirion, 2006; Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007; Peterson and Schleich, 2007). 
Alexeeva-Talebi et al. (2008) introduce the concept of integrating importers into the EU ETS 
showing that while BTA regulation protects the competitiveness of EU energy-intensive 
industries more effectively, the integration of importers induces larger emission reductions of 
foreign competitors.  
Against this background, this paper analyzes the economic and environmental implications of 
two different measures to address adverse competitiveness implications from unilateral 
climate change policies, border tax adjustments and the Clean Development Mechanism, in 
the context of the third trading period of the EU ETS. Employing a multi-sector, multi-region 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of international energy use and global trade, we 
study the competitiveness implications of specific BTA designs for EU exporters and non-EU 
importers, as well as the role of alternative benchmarks for border tax adjustments. 
Furthermore, we analyze the competitiveness impacts of supplementarity rules in the EU ETS 
by assessing alternative CDM demand restrictions.  
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a description of our numerical model 
framework. Section 3 introduces climate policy scenarios for the year 2020. Section 4 
presents the quantitative simulation results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2 Numerical framework 
In the following, we present the quantitative framework of our analysis. We first introduce 
our modeling approach and then briefly discuss prerequisites for our policy assessment. 
2.1 Modelling approach 
For the numerical analysis, we employ a multi-sector, multi-region CGE model of 
international energy use and global trade.  The model reflects the key features of the European 
ETS from a single country perspective: EU Member States are committed to specific carbon 
emissions constraints rE  which are agreed upon. Each of these countries must specify a cap 
ETS
re  and the allocation rule for free emissions allowances to energy-intensive installations in 
sectors that are eligible for international emissions trading. Assuming that the EU trading 
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systems cover only energy-intensive industries implies that complementary domestic 
abatement policies are necessary for the non-covered sectors in order to comply with the 
remaining national emissions budget ( )ETSrr eE − .  
Figure 1 provides a diagrammatic structure of the open-economy CGE model used for 
comparative-static impact analysis of BTA and CDM regimes. For details and an algebraic 
formulation of the core model see Böhringer and Lange (2005). A representative agent RAr in 
each region r is endowed with labour rL , capital rK , and fossil-fuel resources ,ff rQ  which 
may be used for fossil fuel production. The representative agent maximizes utility from 
consumption of a composite good Cr which combines demands for energy and non-energy 
commodities at a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES). Production Yir of commodities i in 
region r is described by nested separable CES functions with the price-dependent use of 
capital, labour, energy and material in production. Carbon emissions are linked in fixed 
proportions to the emissions-relevant use of fossil fuels, while carbon abatement occurs by 
fuel switching or energy savings in production and final consumption. The modelling of 
international trade is based on the Armington approach of product heterogeneity (Armington, 
1969), so that domestic and foreign goods of the same variety are distinguished by their 
origin. All goods used on the domestic market in intermediate and final demand correspond to 
a CES composite Air that combines the domestically produced variety Yir and imports Mir of 
the same variety from other regions. Domestic production Yir either enters the formation of the 
Armington good Air or is exported (Xir) to other regions to satisfy their import demand. Trade 
with other regions is represented by a set of horizontal export demand and import supply 
functions at exogenous world import and export prices. A balance of payment constraint, 
which is warranted through flexible exchange rates, incorporates the benchmark trade deficit 
or surplus. 
The model is based on consistent accounts of national production and consumption, trade and 
energy flows for 2001 as provided by the GTAP 6 database (Dimaranan and McDougall, 
2006). The forward calibration of the 2001 economies to the target year 2020 is based on 
energy trends for EU Member States (EU, 2003) and on international energy projections for 
non-European economies (US Department of Energy, 2005). 
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Figure 1: Diagrammatic overview of the model structure 
 
Table 1 summarizes the regional and sectoral aggregation of the model. The regional 
aggregation of the GTAP database includes nine regions that are central in the climate policy 
debate on competitiveness and leakage. The sectoral aggregation in the model has been 
chosen to distinguish energy-intensive sectors from the rest of the economy. It captures key 
dimensions in the analysis of greenhouse gas abatement, such as differences in carbon 
intensities and the degree of substitutability across carbon-intensive goods. The primary and 
secondary energy goods identified in the model are coal, natural gas, crude oil, refined oil 
products, and electricity. The EU-wide emission trading system is restricted to eight ETS 
sectors (electricity, oil refineries, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, mineral industries, paper 
and pulp production, air transportation and chemicals) as foreseen under the proposal to 
amend the current EU emissions trading scheme (EU, 2008a). The remaining sectors are 
aggregated to a composite industry that produces a non-energy-intensive macro good (NETS). 
Across all BTA policy scenarios, only four energy-intensive and export-oriented sectors 
within the EU ETS are subject to the BTA scheme: iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, mineral 
industries and paper and pulp production. We label these sectors with ETS_BTA, while the 
remaining industries covered by the EU ETS and which are not subject to the BTA scheme 
are named ETS_NBTA. Those sectors not part of the EU ETS are denoted as NETS (Table 1). 
Xir
Air 
RAr 
Cir 
Mir   Other 
Regions 
Fossil fuel sectors, electricity, 
energy-intensive sectors, and other 
sectors 
Yir 
Region r 
L r K r Q ff,r 
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Table 1: Model dimensions 
Production sectors Countries and Regions 
Energy  EU regions 
COA Coal  EU15 Old Member States 
CRU Crude oil  EU12 New Member States 
GAS Natural gas   
OIL Refined oil products (ETS_NBTA)   
ELE Electricity (ETS_NBTA)   
Energy-intensive sectors  Non-EU countries and regions 
ORE Ferrous metals (ETS_BTA)  OOE Rest of OECD 
PPP Paper products and publishing 
(ETS_BTA) 
 RUS Former Soviet Union 
NMM Mineral products nec (ETS_BTA)  SMA Rest of South and Middle America 
NFM Metals nec (ETS_BTA)  CHN China (including Hongkong) 
ATP Air transport (ETS_NBTA)  SEA Rest of South and East Asia 
CRP Chemicals, rubber and plastics   
(ETS_BTA) 
 OPC OPEC 
XRW Rest of the World 
Non-energy-intensive sectors 
ROI Rest of industry (NETS) 
 
CGD Savings good   
 
2.2 Emission reduction targets 
In January 2008, the European Commission has adopted a Proposal to amend the current EU 
ETS Directive. This Proposal is part of draft legislation implementing the Integrated Energy 
Climate Change Package, endorsed by the European Council in March 2007 to limit the rise 
in global average temperature to no more than 2° Celsius above pre-industrial levels. Thereby, 
the Proposal foresees the uniform emission reduction of 21 percent below 2005 emissions for 
the EU ETS sectors (ETS sectors) in all Member States by 2020 (EU, 2008). Commission’s 
Climate Action and Renewable Energy Package of January 2008 contains furthermore the 
Proposal for a Decision on the commitments of Member States to reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions up to 2020 (the so-called “Effort Sharing Decision”) (EU, 2008a). This Proposal 
determines heterogeneous contributions of Member States to meeting the EU greenhouse gas 
emission reduction commitment up to 2020 (in relation to the 2005 emissions level) in sectors 
not covered under the EU ETS Directive (NETS sectors). 
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Table 2 illustrates effective emission reduction targets that apply to the ETS and NETS sectors 
in new and old EU Member States. The effective emission reduction targets are derived using 
the data from the Commission’s Impact Assessment for the years 1990, 2005 and 2020 (EU, 
2008b). A uniform emission reduction target of 21 percent for the ETS sectors (compared to 
the 2005 emissions level) would correspond to an emissions reduction target of about 27.8 
and 26.8 percent versus business-as-usual levels (BaU) in 2020 for the EU15 and EU12, 
respectively. Table 2 further depicts that burden imposed on the NETS sectors is relatively 
moderate in terms of effective emission reductions requirements in 2020. The resulting total 
aggregate commitments versus BaU level would imply comparable effective reduction targets 
for old and new EU Member States in 2020 (22 and 20.4 percent, respectively).  
 
Table 2: Effective emission reduction targets [% vis-à-vis BaU in 1990, 2005 and 2020] 
ETS NETS TOTAL  
1990 2005 2020 1990 2005 2020 1990 2005 2020 
EU15 -17.6 -21.0 -27.8 -8.5 -13.8 -16.1 -12.9 -17.3 -22.0 
EU12 -43.2 -21.0 -26.8 -16.5 13.2 -11.0 -33.6 -8.4 -20.4 
EU27 -24.9 -21.0 -27.6 -10.0 -10.2 -15.3 -17.8 -15.7 -21.7 
Source: EU (2008b) and own calculations 
Finally, all non-EU regions are assumed to not having committed to binding emissions 
reduction targets in 2020. 
 
3 Policy scenarios 
In order to assess the competitiveness impacts of unilateral EU emission regulation with 
border tax adjustments and the CDM, we introduce climate policy scenarios for the year 2020. 
The ETS sectors are assumed to be allocated tradable allowances, while the remaining 
industries (NETS) have to be regulated via domestic carbon tax in order to meet the national 
emissions reduction targets in 2020. The regulation stringency in the EU is represented by the 
underlying regional effective emissions reduction targets in 2020 as presented in the previous 
section. In contrast, all non-EU regions are assumed to refrain from quantitative emission 
reduction commitments. Table 3 presents the set of climate policy scenarios for the year 2020.  
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Table 3: Climate policy scenarios for 2020 
Regulation 
 
Scenario 
EU ETS EU  export subsidy 
Non-EU  
import tariff 
CDM  
Access 
ETS Yes No No No 
BTA_EX Yes Yes No No 
BTA_IM Yes No Yes No 
BTA_EXIM Yes Yes Yes No 
ETS_CDM10 Yes No No 
10% of emission 
reduction 
requirement 
ETS_CDM41 Yes No No 
41% of emission 
reduction 
requirement 
 
As a reference case, scenario ETS reflects the upcoming European emission trading scheme in 
2020, without any complementary measures to mitigate negative competitiveness impacts on 
European energy-intensive and export-oriented industries. 
In scenarios labelled BTA, we introduce three alternative regimes of border tax adjustments 
into the EU ETS. Under BTA_EX, only EU exporters receive a subsidy, while importers into 
the EU are not regulated. Under BTA_IM, non-EU importers into the European Union are 
charged, while EU exporters do not receive any compensation. Under BTA_EXIM, both 
compensation for EU exporters and tariffs for non-EU importers are applied to ETS_BTA 
industries. In our core scenarios, both the duty levied on imports and the rebate for the EU 
exports in the covered sectors are quantity-based, i.e. the BTA level is determined by the EU 
average carbon content in the production of the respective energy-intensive good. Thus, 
sector-specific tariffs (per unit of export and/or import) are calculated with the EU ETS 
allowance price and the EU average carbon content in the corresponding sector. 
Consequently, no information about carbon intensities of foreign producers is necessary in the 
core simulations. For the scenarios BTA_IM and BTA_EXIM we, however, additionally vary 
the carbon intensity to determine the level of the import tariff. In this case, we assess a BTA 
regime in which industrialized and developing importing countries face an import tariff based 
on the average carbon content of the corresponding energy-intensive good of industrialized 
and developing regions, respectively.  
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Finally, we analyze the role of the CDM for the competitiveness implications of unilateral EU 
emission regulation. Regarding the access to project-based emission reductions, the 
Marrakech Accords to the Kyoto Protocol demands that “the use of the mechanisms shall be 
supplemental to domestic action” (UNFCCC, 2002). Besides the supplementarity issue under 
the Kyoto Protocol, there is a separate supplementarity debate regarding the EU ETS: The 
scheme’s amending directive states that “CDM credits up to the remainder of the level which 
they were allowed in the second trading period (2008-12) should be allowed in the third 
trading period” (EU, 2008a) and thus abstracts from specifying a quantitative limit for the 
import of CDM credits. As a consequence, we specify two tentative cases with the (relatively) 
restricted and generous CDM access for those sectors covered by the EU ETS: Scenario 
ETS_CDM10 assumes that CDM imports are limited to only 10 percent of the effective 
emission reduction requirement of EU ETS sectors in the year 2020. Scenario ETS_CDM41 
assumes that CDM imports are allowed to a higher percentage of the effective reduction 
requirement of EU ETS sectors. This level of supplementarity has been endogenously 
determined to mimic the production level losses in the EU 27 under the most ambitious BTA 
regime (BTA_EXIM).1 For comparability, all CDM scenarios abstract from any application of 
border tax adjustments. 
 
4 Simulation results 
In this section, we discuss the environmental and competitiveness implications of unilateral 
EU emission regulation in 2020. While the former are measured by changes in carbon 
emissions, the latter are approximated by impacts on macroeconomic production values 
(output changes) resulting from alternative climate policy regimes. The entire set of numerical 
simulation results is provided in the Appendix. 
4.1 EU benchmarks for BTA 
As the starting point, we focus on scenarios where the sector-specific level of BTA is 
determined by the EU average carbon content of production of the respective energy-intensive 
good. We first discuss the economic implications for the EU, before analyzing effects for the 
non-EU countries. 
 
                                                 
1 Compare scenarios ETS_CDM41 and BTA_EXIM in Table 6  of the Appendix. 
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Impacts for the European Union  
Figure 2 illustrates environmental implications in the sectors of our main interest, i.e. the 
European ETS_BTA industries which are both part of the EU ETS and the BTA scheme, for 
old and new EU Member States.  
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Figure 2: Adjustments in carbon emissions levels by European ETS_BTA sectors (% vs. BAU) 
 
Our results indicate that across all scenarios, the EU12 reduces a larger percentage of BAU 
emissions than the EU15, a result that reflects the relatively lower marginal abatement cost 
levels in new EU Member States. As a consequence, the EU12 exports emission allowances 
to the EU15 region that features relatively costly abatement options. Under the BTA regimes, 
however, energy-intensive and export-oriented sectors (ETS_BTA) in both regions increase 
production and associated carbon emissions in comparison to the pure EU ETS scheme, 
respectively. This is either due to subsidization of domestic output or taxation of competing 
foreign goods. Emission abatement decreases if non-EU importers are charged the import 
tariff (scenario BTA_IM), but to a smaller extent than in the case of tax compensations for EU 
exporters (scenario BTA_EX). This implies increasing both the carbon permit price in the EU 
ETS from 27 to 28 US$ per ton of CO2 (see Table 4 in the Appendix), and the import of EU 
emission allowances from remaining energy-intensive industries (ETS_NBTA) which have 
hence to reduce a larger amount of emissions (see Table 5 in the Appendix). Obviously, the 
largest decrease in emission abatement occurs under BTA_EXIM. However, the emission 
reductions vary moderately across all three BTA regimes, ranging between roughly 6 and 10 
percent. 
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Regarding the environmental implications of the CDM access, Figure 3 implies that (granting) 
CDM access of only 10 percent of the effective emission reduction requirement for EU ETS 
sectors – in the absence of any BTA regulations – decreases domestic abatement of EU 
Member States to less than two percent of BAU emission levels (scenario ETS_CDM10). A 
larger share of the CDM within the EU ETS of up to 41 percent of the effective emission 
reduction requirement further reduces domestic carbon abatement. Obviously, the availability 
of low-cost emission reductions in developing countries induces carbon abatement shifting to 
these regions (see again Table 5). This effect is reflected by a substantial drop in the 
international permit price, amounting to 4.3 and 1.3 US$ per ton of CO2 for CDM access of 
10 and 41 percent, respectively.  
We now turn to the associated competitiveness impacts of all alternative climate policy 
scenarios for European energy-intensive and export-oriented industries (ETS_BTA) which are 
measured as adjustments in the production level. Figure 3 illustrates output changes for old 
and new EU Member States across six scenarios.  
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Figure 3: Output change for ETS_BTA sectors by EU region and scenario (% vs. BAU) 
 
As energy-related carbon emissions represent one of the main input factors into the 
production process, the output impacts from unilateral EU emission regulation – as displayed 
in the Figure 3 – are to a large extent consistent with the environmental impacts discussed 
above. First, the EU12 faces higher output losses than the EU15 across all policy scenarios. 
Second, regarding the alternative BTA regulations, we find output losses in European 
ETS_BTA sectors (in the EU27 aggregation) to be lower when EU exporters are subsidized 
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than in the case of imposing a tariff on competing non-EU importers (see Table 5 in the 
Appendix). The lowest production losses for European ETS_BTA sectors are obviously 
induced by the combination of a subsidy for EU exporters and tariffs for non-EU importers. 
For the EU15, the output losses under a pure EU ETS even turn to output gains in scenario 
BTA_EXIM.  
Our most interesting finding relates to the competitiveness implications of the CDM access. 
Figure 3 implies that granting even a restricted CDM access to EU ETS industries largely 
alleviates the negative competitiveness impacts from the unilateral emission regulation. The 
negative implications for the EU12 and EU15 are particularly low with a relatively generous 
access to the CDM projects (41 percent) – this scenario has been designed to mimic the 
production level losses in the EU 27 under the most ambitious BTA regime (BTA_EXIM). We 
find that the output losses in the EU12 and EU15 are in this case always lower than under 
almost all BTA regimes: The availability of low-cost emission reductions in developing 
countries decreases energy-related production costs of carbon regulation. But it does not 
induce output gains for European ETS_BTA sectors in the EU15 region. We conclude that 
increasing “where-flexibility” of emission abatement for EU ETS participants via (even 
limited) access to the CDM can be an attractive alternative to the application of border tax 
adjustments for alleviating adverse competitiveness impacts of unilateral climate policy. 
Since our methodology allows to assess spillover effects to and market interactions with 
remaining industries, in Appendix (Table 5 and Table 6) we additionally report environmental 
and competitiveness implications for (i) those industries covered by the EU ETS and not 
subject to the BTA scheme (ETS_NBTA) and (ii) those sectors not part of the EU emission 
trading scheme (NETS). Table 5 first shows that European ETS_NBTA sectors reduce a much 
larger amount of their BAU emissions (between 25 and 30 percent) than the ETS_BTA 
industries of the EU (between 6 and 10 percent). This implies that those EU ETS industries 
that are regulated by border tax adjustments are importing a considerable amount of emission 
allowances from the remaining EU ETS sectors that feature lower marginal abatement cost 
level. Our results confirm the intuition that emissions abatement in European ETS_NBTA 
industries is hardly affected by alternative BTA regulations. However, as in the case of the 
ETS_BTA sectors, limited CDM access drastically decreases domestic abatement of EU 
Member States in these industries as well (as compared to a pure EU ETS). According to the 
Table 6, the associated competitiveness impacts of alternative climate policy scenarios for 
European ETS_NBTA industries reflect the effects on the emissions market: Output losses do 
not vary across BTA scenarios but remain at a comparably high level due to the high emission 
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reduction requirements. In contrast, negative competitiveness effects are substantially 
alleviated by allowing CDM access to ETS_NBTA industries. For European non-energy-
intensive industries (NETS) that are excluded from EU emissions trading, neither alternative 
BTA regulations, nor limited CDM access for EU ETS sectors substantially affect emission 
abatement. Across all scenarios, the output effects in NETS sectors represent the mirror image 
to the output effects in ETS_BTA industries, albeit with a smaller variation. Thus, 
competitiveness gains (losses) of EU sectors that are subject to the BTA scheme go at the 
expense (are benefiting) those industries that are not part of EU ETS. 
 
Impacts for non-EU regions  
Besides environmental and competitiveness implications for the EU, Table 5 and Table 6 in 
the Appendix present simulation results for non-EU regions. Hereafter, we focus our 
discussion on the non-European ETS_BTA industries. We find out that unilateral EU climate 
policy increases carbon emission levels in regions beyond Europe. This is due to decreasing 
EU’s demand for energy which causes the international price of fossil fuels to fall. This 
phenomenon is known as energy channel “carbon leakage”. According to Table 5, the 
increase of emissions in non-EU regions remains at a rather moderate level across all 
scenarios. Further, Table 6 demonstrates that non-EU ETS_BTA sectors benefit from 
unilateral EU climate policy in terms of positive competitiveness implications: Across all 
BTA scenarios, non-EU regions feature production increases, most of all the Former Soviet 
Union (up to one percent) and the OPEC countries (up to 2 percent). Obviously, these positive 
output impacts are particularly small for the more extensive BTA regime (scenario 
BTA_EXIM). Importantly, under the CDM regulation, major developing countries face 
production losses in the respective sectors due to substantial emission reduction requirements 
from the European Union. 
 
 
4.2 Non-EU benchmarks for BTA 
Now we abstract from the assumption that the BTA level for industrialized and developing 
countries is based on the carbon content of the respective EU ETS sectors. Instead, we assume 
that the sector-specific BTA level for the former is based on the average carbon content in the 
production of the industrialized countries, while the tariffs for the latter is calculated with the 
average carbon content in the production of respective sectors in the developing countries. As 
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new benchmarks apply to the import tariffs, only policy scenarios BTA_IM and BTA_EXIM 
might be affected by new parameters. Figure 4 contrasts output changes of European 
ETS_BTA industries for the cases of EU benchmarks and non-EU benchmarks (all 
quantitative results are compiled in Table 7 of the Appendix). 
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Figure 4: Output change for ETS_BTA sectors by EU region and BTA scenario (% vs. BAU), 
contrasting EU benchmarks (EU) and non-EU benchmarks (NEU) for import tariffs 
 
 
Our results demonstrate that the choice of regional benchmarks (i.e. carbon intensities) for an 
import tariff substantially affects competitiveness impacts of unilateral EU climate policy. For 
the EU12, output losses are considerably lower in the case of non-EU benchmarks, while for 
the EU15 negative competitiveness effects even turn to gains. This is due to the fact that the 
average carbon content of the respective energy-intensive goods in non-EU industrialized and 
developing regions is considerably higher than the EU average. As a consequence, the BTA 
tariff charged to non-EU importers is significantly higher in the case of non-EU benchmarks, 
which boosts the international competitiveness of the respective European industries. 
Focusing on the effects for the ETS_BTA industries in non-European regions (Table 6 to 
Table 7 in the Appendix), we detect that these industries face large competitiveness losses 
from the application of non-EU benchmarks as compared to EU average values.  
 
5 Conclusions 
In January 2008, the European Commission presented a comprehensive legislative package 
intended to implement the ambitious climate and energy policy goals formulated by the 
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European Council for the year 2020, including new regulations for the third trading period of 
the European Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). Ambitious unilateral EU environmental 
policy evoked concerns about adverse competitiveness implications for European energy-
intensive and export-oriented sectors. As a remedy, the European Parliament has recently 
proposed to consider border tax adjustments (BTA) for third countries which are not foreseen 
by the Kyoto Protocol. The European Commission took up this proposal. Granting (a 
relatively generous) access to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) within the EU ETS 
might, however, represent a valuable alternative to border tax adjustments. Employing a 
multi-sector, multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of international 
energy use and global trade, we have analyzed the environmental and competitiveness 
implications of introducing border tax adjustments and the Clean Development Mechanism 
within the EU Emission Trading Scheme. 
Our quantitative simulation results indicate that offsetting measures under consideration (i.e. 
BTA and the CDM) differ with respect to their impact on the European carbon market: While 
the application of border tax adjustments within the EU ETS slightly increases demand for 
emission allowances in the regulated sectors and the carbon permit price, the associated 
environmental impacts remain rather limited. In contrast, granting access to low-cost 
abatement options of the CDM to EU ETS participants decreases domestic abatement of EU 
Member States substantially and causes a drop in the allowance price. 
Regarding the competitiveness implications of alternative BTA schemes, we find that output 
losses in the European energy-intensive and export-oriented sectors are particularly low if the 
most extensive BTA scheme (i.e. a combination of a subsidy for EU exporters and tariffs for 
non-EU importers) is applied. Among the unidirectional BTA regimes, the next best option 
for the EU15 would include subsidizing the EU exporters, while levying tariffs on non-EU 
importers appears to be more attractive for the EU12. However, we also demonstrate that the 
choice of (alternative) benchmarks (i.e. carbon intensities) for the level of a BTA-related 
import tariff might substantially affect the competitiveness implications of unilateral EU 
climate policy. Applying BTA benchmarks based on (relatively high) non-EU carbon contents 
of the respective energy-intensive good alleviates output losses for the EU12 region to a much 
larger extent than the application of EU benchmarks, while for the EU15 region formerly 
negative competitiveness effects even turn to gains. In this case, both EU12 and EU15 would 
benefit more from levying tariffs on non-EU importers.  
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In our simulations, (even a rather) limited CDM access for EU ETS participants induces lower 
output losses for the European energy-intensive and export-oriented sectors than under almost 
all BTA regimes. We conclude that increasing “where-flexibility” of emission abatement for 
EU ETS participants via limited access to the CDM can be an attractive alternative to the 
application of border tax adjustments for alleviating adverse competitiveness impacts of 
unilateral climate policy. 
Our findings underline once more the importance of accounting for the spillover effects with 
the not-regulated industries. Particularly, we demonstrate that competitiveness gains of EU 
ETS sectors that are subject to the BTA scheme go at the expense those industries that are 
excluded from EU emissions trading.  
The impact of unilateral EU climate policy on non-EU carbon emissions in the main 
competing sectors is characterized by increased energy demand in non-EU regions, as EU 
emission regulation causes the international price of fossil fuels to fall. However, this 
phenomenon of “carbon leakage” remains rather moderate and can be attenuated through  
BTA regulations. Carbon leakage is even more modest when CDM access is granted for the 
EU ETS sectors, as the associated emission reductions in developing countries largely 
outweigh the emission increases in industrialized regions. While the competing non-EU 
sectors benefit from unilateral EU climate policy in terms of competitiveness, these effects are 
alleviated by BTA regulations. In the case of CDM access for EU ETS sectors, major 
developing countries face production losses due to substantial emission reductions. 
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Appendix: List of Tables 
 
 
Table 4: CO2 permit price for ETS sectors by region and scenario ($US per ton of CO2) 
Scenario 
 
 Region 
ETS BTA EX 
BTA 
IM 
BTA 
EXIM 
ETS 
CDM10 
ETS 
CDM41 
 EU benchmarks 
 EU15 27.24 27.89 27.55 28.21 4.35 1.43
 EU12 27.24 27.89 27.55 28.21 4.35 1.43
 Non-Eu benchmarks 
 EU15 27.24 27.89 28.45 29.13 4.35 1.43
 EU12 27.24 27.89 28.45 29.13 4.35 1.43
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Table 5: EU benchmarks – Carbon emissions change by region, sector and scenario (% vs. BaU) 
Region 
Scenario 
 
 Sector 
ETS BTA EX 
BTA 
IM 
BTA 
EXIM 
ETS 
CDM10 
ETS 
CDM41 
 Total -22.34 -22.32 -22.34 -22.32 -12.89 -11.00
 ETS_BTA -8.31 -7.06 -7.59 -6.34 -1.03 0.00
 ETS_NBTA -29.55 -29.57 -29.58 -29.60 -10.06 -6.13
 EU15 
 NETS -16.10 -16.10 -16.10 -16.10 -16.10 -16.10
 Total -18.27 -18.36 -18.27 -18.36 -7.20 -4.98
 ETS_BTA -10.16 -9.61 -9.58 -9.04 -1.52 -0.26
 ETS_NBTA -25.26 -25.52 -25.36 -25.62 -5.16 -1.06
 EU12 
 NETS -11.00 -11.00 -11.00 -11.00 -11.00 -11.00
 Total -21.70 -21.70 -21.70 -21.70 -12.00 -10.06
 ETS_BTA  -9.07 -8.11 -8.41 -7.45 -1.23 -0.11
 ETS_NBTA -28.83 -28.9 -28.88 -28.94 -9.24 -5.29
 EU27 
 NETS -15.44 -15.44 -15.44 -15.44 -15.44 -15.44
 Total 0.71 0.69 0.70 0.68 0.40 0.34
 ETS_BTA 0.72 0.41 0.56 0.26 0.66 0.62
 ETS_NBTA 0.80 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.29 0.19
 Rest of  
 OECD 
 NETS 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.55 0.55
 Total 1.14 1.03 1.07 0.97 1.32 1.02
 ETS_BTA 1.61 1.01 1.30 0.71 1.42 1.35
 ETS_NBTA 1.39 1.30 1.33 1.24 1.74 1.28
 Former  
 Soviet  
 Union 
 NETS 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.48
 Total 1.03 0.99 1.01 0.97 0.76 0.66
 ETS_BTA 0.99 0.59 0.75 0.34 1.02 0.96
 ETS_NBTA 2.14 2.12 2.13 2.10 1.41 1.17
 South and  
 Central    
 America 
 NETS 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.20
 Total 0.96 0.91 0.93 0.88 -17.52 -12.53
 ETS_BTA 0.70 0.44 0.55 0.30 -0.94 -0.33
 ETS_NBTA 1.25 1.19 1.21 1.15 -18.31 -11.86
 China 
 NETS 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.37 -19.89 -17.19
 Total 1.07 0.98 1.00 0.92 -14.37 -14.37
 ETS_BTA 1.03 0.54 0.61 0.12 -13.99 -13.98
 ETS_NBTA 1.17 1.10 1.13 1.05 -19.35 -19.38
 Rest of  
 South and  
 East Asia 
 NETS 0.88 0.91 0.90 0.92 -5.14 -5.08
 Total 0.98 0.88 0.92 0.81 0.66 0.55
 ETS_BTA 2.68 1.92 2.29 1.52 2.49 2.36
 ETS_NBTA 1.45 1.37 1.41 1.33 0.99 0.85
 OPEC 
 NETS 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.14 -0.13 -0.20
 Total 2.10 1.87 1.92 1.70 2.26 1.72
 ETS_BTA 2.58 1.20 1.64 0.29 3.58 2.84
 ETS_NBTA 3.31 3.12 3.15 2.97 3.25 2.41
 Rest of  
 World 
 NETS 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.41 0.36
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Table 6: EU benchmarks – Output change by region, sector and scenario (% vs. BaU) 
Region 
Scenario 
 
 Sector 
ETS BTA EX 
BTA 
IM 
BTA 
EXIM 
ETS 
CDM10 
ETS 
CDM41 
 Total -0.40 -0.47 -0.43 -0.51 -0.43 -0.42
 ETS_BTA -1.58 -0.38 -1.12 0.11 -0.23 -0.08
 ETS_NBTA -10.28 -10.14 -10.23 -10.10 -2.76 -1.69
 EU15 
 NETS -0.39 -0.47 -0.43 -0.51 -0.43 -0.42
 Total -0.15 -0.18 -0.19 -0.22 -0.14 -0.14
 ETS_BTA -2.53 -2.29 -2.15 -1.90 -0.54 -0.32
 ETS_NBTA -7.05 -7.07 -7.02 -7.04 -0.46 0.53
 EU12 
 NETS -0.12 -0.16 -0.16 -0.20 -0.14 -0.14
 Total -0.38 -0.45 -0.41 -0.49 -0.40 -0.40
 ETS_BTA -1.69 -0.58 -1.23 -0.11 -0.26 -0.11
 ETS_NBTA -9.54 -9.44 -9.49 -9.40 -2.24 -1.18
 EU27 
 NETS -0.37 -0.44 -0.41 -0.48 -0.40 -0.40
 Total 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
 ETS_BTA 0.21 -0.05 0.10 -0.17 0.11 0.07
 ETS_NBTA 0.75 0.72 0.73 0.71 0.26 0.17
 Rest of  
 OECD 
 NETS 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
 Total 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.23
 ETS_BTA 1.08 0.71 0.92 0.55 0.95 0.88
 ETS_NBTA 0.95 0.84 0.88 0.78 0.45 0.37
 Former  
 Soviet  
 Union 
 NETS 0.19 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.22
 Total 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.07
 ETS_BTA 0.45 0.10 0.27 -0.09 0.32 0.27
 ETS_NBTA 1.79 1.78 1.78 1.77 0.84 0.64
 South and  
 Central    
 America 
 NETS 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.07
 Total 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.04
 ETS_BTA 0.18 -0.04 0.03 -0.19 -0.14 -0.03
 ETS_NBTA 0.38 0.30 0.33 0.25 -1.63 -1.29
 China 
 NETS 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.04
 Total 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.08 -0.07 -0.06
 ETS_BTA 0.65 0.08 0.30 -0.27 -2.82 -2.88
 ETS_NBTA 0.86 0.78 0.81 0.73 -3.78 -3.83
 Rest of  
 South and  
 East Asia 
 NETS 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.08 -0.05 -0.04
 Total 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.18 0.18
 ETS_BTA 2.23 1.64 1.95 1.35 1.89 1.75
 ETS_NBTA 1.87 1.81 1.83 1.78 0.98 0.79
 OPEC 
 NETS 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.17
 Total 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.16
 ETS_BTA 1.16 0.53 0.87 0.23 1.18 0.98
 ETS_NBTA 2.77 2.58 2.61 2.43 1.43 1.05
 Rest of  
 World 
 NETS 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.16 0.14 0.16
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Table 7: Non-EU benchmarks – Carbon emissions and output change by region, sector and scenario  
Region 
Scenario 
 
 Sector 
BTA 
IM 
BTA 
EXIM 
BTA 
IM 
BTA 
EXIM 
 Emissions change  (% vs. BaU) Output change  (% vs. BaU) 
 Total -22.32 -22.30 -0.55 -0.62
 ETS_BTA -5.91 -4.66 0.62 1.88
 ETS_NBTA -29.63 -29.65 -10.06 -9.92
 EU15 
 NETS -16.10 -16.10 -0.55 -0.63
 Total -18.35 -18.45 -0.30 -0.33
 ETS_BTA -8.41 -7.89 -0.98 -0.73
 ETS_NBTA -25.70 -25.97 -7.01 -7.04
 EU12 
 NETS -11.00 -11.00 -0.28 -0.32
 Total -21.70 -21.70 -0.53 -0.60
 ETS_BTA -6.94 -5.99 0.44 1.60
 ETS_NBTA -28.97 -29.04 -9.36 -9.26
 EU27 
 NETS -15.44 -15.44 -0.53 -0.61
 Total 0.70 0.68 0.02 0.03
 ETS_BTA 0.30 -0.02 -0.16 -0.43
 ETS_NBTA 0.79 0.77 0.72 0.70
 Rest of  
 OECD 
 NETS 0.58 0.58 0.02 0.04
 Total 1.07 0.96 0.23 0.26
 ETS_BTA 1.12 0.52 0.83 0.45
 ETS_NBTA 1.36 1.26 0.86 0.76
 Former  
 Soviet  
 Union 
 NETS 0.57 0.57 0.22 0.25
 Total 0.88 0.84 0.10 0.12
 ETS_BTA -0.01 -0.40 -0.45 -0.82
 ETS_NBTA 1.98 1.96 1.68 1.66
 South and  
 Central    
 America 
 NETS 0.18 0.19 0.10 0.13
 Total 0.84 0.79 0.11 0.13
 ETS_BTA 0.33 0.08 -0.50 -0.72
 ETS_NBTA 1.10 1.04 0.17 0.09
 China 
 NETS 0.37 0.40 0.11 0.14
 Total 0.76 0.68 0.13 0.16
 ETS_BTA -0.68 -1.16 -1.28 -1.85
 ETS_NBTA 0.93 0.85 0.58 0.50
 Rest of  
 South and  
 East Asia 
 NETS 0.94 0.97 0.13 0.17
 Total 0.64 0.54 0.26 0.29
 ETS_BTA 0.55 -0.19 0.26 -0.34
 ETS_NBTA 1.20 1.13 1.65 1.60
 OPEC 
 NETS 0.14 0.18 0.25 0.29
 Total 1.07 0.88 0.30 0.35
 ETS_BTA -1.75 -2.94 -1.78 -2.44
 ETS_NBTA 2.20 2.04 1.75 1.60
 Rest of  
 World 
 NETS 0.18 0.21 0.31 0.36
 
